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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FALTERING PROMISE OF FDA TOBACCO REGULATION

MICAH L. BERMAN*
ABSTRACT
Congress passed the Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in 2009, giving the FDA
the authority to regulate tobacco products for the first time. Ten years later, the
promise that the TCA’s enactment would be a transformative moment for public
health has not materialized. To the contrary, the FDA’s most notable regulatory
effort—requiring graphic warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements—
has been struck down in court, and the FDA is now scrambling to address a
youth e-cigarette epidemic that caught it off guard. This Article provides a brief
review of TCA implementation during the Obama administration, and it reviews
the Trump administration’s “comprehensive plan” for nicotine regulation. It
concludes with a discussion of the structural obstacles to more robust FDA
tobacco regulation.

* Associate Professor of Public Health and Law, The Ohio State University. Thanks to Rob Gattter
and the participants at the 2018 St. Louis University Health Law Symposium on “Public Health in
the Era of Alternative Facts, Isolationism, and the One Percent”; Lindsay Wiley, Marc Scheineson,
and the participants at American University Washington College of Law’s “FDA: Past, Present,
and Future” symposium; and my colleagues who participated in the Moritz College of Law junior
faculty workshop and the Health Services Management and Policy works-in-progress series.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act (TCA) with overwhelming bipartisan majorities, 1 giving the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), for the first time, comprehensive regulatory
authority over tobacco products. 2 At the signing ceremony, President Obama
triumphantly declared, “Thanks to the work of Democrats and Republicans . . .
the decades-long effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of
tobacco has emerged victorious.” 3
Ten years later, the promise that the TCA’s enactment would be a
transformative moment for public health has not been fulfilled. Smoking rates,
for the most part, have continued their slight year-to-year declines, but
implementation of the TCA has so far failed to impact this overall trend in any
perceptible way. 4 E-cigarette use among youth, which was essentially a nonissue in 2009, has become an “epidemic” that threatens to produce “a whole
generation of young people . . . addicted to nicotine.” 5 The FDA’s most notable
regulatory effort—requiring large, graphic warnings on cigarette packages and
advertisements—was struck down in court on First Amendment grounds. 6 And

1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009). The Act was approved in the Senate by a 79-19 margin. H.R.1256 - Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll
_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00207 (last visited Mar. 29,
2019). The Act was approved by the House of Representatives by a 307-97 vote. Id.
2. The history leading up to the enactment of the TCA is beyond the scope of this paper. For
a detailed review of the FDA’s unsuccessful first attempt to regulate tobacco products in the 1990s,
see generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT 383–84 (2001).
3. Barack Obama, Remarks regarding the Signing of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (June 22, 2009) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/video/President-Obama-Signs-Kids-Tobacco-Legislation/#transcript).
4. See Ahmed Jamal et al., Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults — United States, 2005–
2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1233, 1233, 1235 (2015).
5. FDA Statement, FDA, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New
Steps to Address Epidemic of Youth E-cigarette Use (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-addressepidemic-youth-e-cigarette-use. Counting e-cigarette use as a form of tobacco use (as the FDA
does), the rate of past-30-day tobacco use among high school students was higher in 2018 (at
27.1%) than in any year since 2002. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 4.9
Million Middle and High School Students Used Tobacco Products in 2018 (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2019/p0211-youth-tobacco-use-increased.html; René A.
Arrazola et al., Patterns of Current Use of Tobacco Products Among US High School Students for
2000–2012—Findings from the National Youth Tobacco Survey, 54 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 54,
56 tbl.1 (2014).
6. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208, 1222 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
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policies within the FDA’s authority that could save tens of thousands of lives,
such as prohibiting the sale of menthol cigarettes, have not been put in place. 7
What happened? Why has the TCA, at least to this point, failed to deliver on
its promise? In search of answers, this Article reviews some of the key
developments in the ten years the FDA has had regulatory authority over tobacco
products. From the outset, there have been competing visions of what the TCA
was designed to do and how it might be implemented. Tobacco companies
expected that the law would essentially lock in the status quo and protect their
market positions, while public health groups intended for the FDA to
aggressively reshape the industry in order to sharply reduce smoking rates. It
was impossible for these conflicting views to simultaneously be correct. Under
the Obama administration, the tobacco industry’s view of how the law would
function was far closer to the reality. And although the FDA under the Trump
administration has proposed surprisingly strong tobacco control measures (such
as reducing the level of nicotine in cigarettes), a combination of structural factors
makes it unlikely that these measures will be implemented anytime soon. Part II
of this Article reviews the competing perspectives of what the TCA was intended
to accomplish. Part III describes how some key battles over the TCA’s
implementation played out during the Obama administration. Part IV then
describes the Trump administration’s “comprehensive plan” for nicotine
regulation, its status to date, and its future prospects. The Article concludes with
a brief discussion of the structural challenges that prevent the FDA from being
a more aggressive tobacco control agency and calls for a renewed focus on
progress at the state and local level.
II. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE TCA
The TCA passed as a bipartisan, compromise bill, with support from all of
the major public health and tobacco control groups (the Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, the American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society, etc.)
and from the nation’s largest tobacco company, Altria Group. This odd
bedfellows partnership was possible because the two sides had very different
visions of how the law would be implemented. 8

7. The Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee—the body set up by the TCA to
advise the FDA on tobacco-related matters—estimated in 2011 that a rule prohibiting the sale of
menthol cigarettes would save more than 300,000 lives by the year 2050. TOBACCO PRODS. SCI.
ADVISORY COMM., MENTHOL CIGARETTES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 205 tbl.1 (2011), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170
405201750/https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/
TobaccoProductsScientificAdvisoryCommittee/UCM247689.pdf.
8. See Michael Givel, Philip Morris’ FDA Gambit: Good for Public Health?, 26 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 450 (2005) (analyzing earlier version of the TCA and discussing the interests of
both the public health community and Philip Morris in pursing FDA regulation).
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From the tobacco industry’s side, the law established that tobacco products,
and cigarettes in particular, would be subject to regulation, but that they were
here to stay as legitimate, regulated products. The purpose of the TCA, from the
industry’s perspective, was to educate the public, prevent the introduction of
new products that would harm public health more, and get rid of “bad actors”
(e.g., those selling counterfeit cigarettes or allowing sales to minors)—but
otherwise to let people make their own decisions about whether to smoke.
Indeed, the law’s “purpose” section states that one goal of the TCA was to
“continue to permit the sale of tobacco products to adults in conjunction with
measures to ensure that they are not sold or accessible to underage
purchasers[.]” 9 This framing amounted to a congressional stamp of approval for
two of the industry’s key talking points: that smoking is an “adult choice” and
that the industry has no interest in selling to minors. 10
On a more practical level, the law also provided concrete advantages to the
major tobacco companies. 11 For one, the law’s “grandfathering” provision
exempted products that were commercially available as of February 15, 2007
from the Act’s premarket review requirements, but it required expensive and
cumbersome marketing applications for products introduced after that date. 12
This naturally favored the companies that dominated the market as of 2007 and

9. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3.
10. Edith D. Balbach et al., How the Health Belief Model Helps the Tobacco Industry:
Individuals, Choice, and “Information”, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iv37, iv38 (2006). (“The view
presented by [tobacco industry] executives . . . is that the responsibility of cigarette manufacturers
is simply to support the individuals’ right to choose to smoke and to offer them more choices among
products. Moral agency is lodged only within individual consumers, who can choose to exercise
those ‘rights’. If the consumer makes unfortunate choices, the industry and its products are not to
blame.”). It is important to note that these two talking points are demonstrably false. The vast
majority of current smokers started smoking as minors, not as adults, and the industry has a long
history of marketing to youth. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006) (detailing industry practices of marketing to youth).
11. Due to post-TCA consolidation, there are two only two major tobacco companies that
control roughly 90% of the U.S. cigarette market: Altria (which owns Philip Morris USA), and
Reynolds American (which owns R.J. Reynolds). Reynolds American is in turn owned by British
American Tobacco, one of the world’s largest international tobacco companies. In addition to the
practical advantages provided by regulation, there is substantial evidence that Altria/Philip Morris
supported FDA regulation in order to boost its public image. See Patricia A. McDaniel & Ruth E.
Malone, Understanding Philip Morris’s Pursuit of US Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14
TOBACCO CONTROL 193 (2005); Stanton A. Glantz et al., Compromise or Capitulation? US Food
and Drug Administration Jurisdiction over Tobacco Products, PLOS MED., July 2009, at 1, 2;
Reynolds, Altria Lead Smokers Toward Tobacco’s New Era, YAHOO! FIN.: INV’R’S BUS. DAILY
(Aug. 1, 2014), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/reynolds-altria-lead-smokers-toward-2126004
34.html; Leo Sun, A Foolish Take: Which Companies Control the U.S. Tobacco Market?, MOTLEY
FOOL (May 9, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/05/01/a-foolish-take-which-compa
nies-control-the-us-toba.aspx.
12. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 910.
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made it difficult for new rivals to emerge. 13 Relatedly, large companies like
Altria and Reynolds American can easily absorb substantial new compliancerelated costs (like the requirement to engage in product testing and report levels
of “harmful and potentially harmful constituents” 14), but smaller companies
cannot. Again, this reinforced the incumbent advantage these companies already
possessed. Finally, it is likely that Altria—perhaps with a wink to its more
litigious rival, Reynolds American—thought that any aggressive moves by the
FDA could be defeated either through the courts or by lobbying the
administration or Congress. 15 Indeed, immediately after the law was passed, R.J.
Reynolds (and other tobacco companies and retailers) prevailed in a legal
challenge that knocked out what would likely have been one of the TCA’s most
effective measures—limits on the use of colors and graphics in advertising for
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. 16 This provision was invalidated on First
Amendment grounds by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the FDA did
not appeal to the Supreme Court. 17
Meanwhile, public health groups had a very different view of the law and
what the FDA would do with its newfound authority. When the law was signed
by President Obama, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids called it a “historic
blow against the greatest public health menace of our time,” and said, “[w]e look
forward to the FDA effectively implementing this law and using the strong
authority it has been given to fundamentally change how tobacco products are
manufactured, marketed and sold in the United States.” 18 Indeed, the law did
grant the FDA tremendous regulatory powers, including the ability to:
• Set “product standards” to reduce the addictiveness, toxicity, or appeal of
tobacco products (including, for example, by reducing nicotine levels or
prohibiting the use of certain flavors) 19;

13. See Lawrence O. Gostin, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Politics, Law, and the Public’s
Health, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1459, 1460 (2009) (noting that “the [TCA] is a way of solidifying
Altria’s market dominance, with regulatory hurdles dampening competition, particularly the
introduction of ‘safer’ cigarettes.”).
14. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 914.
15. See Letter from Michael E. Szymanczyk, Chairman & CEO, Altria Group, Inc. to the
President of the United States (June 12, 2009) (on file with author) (stating that Altria supported
the Tobacco Control Act, but noting that it opposed some provisions, “including those that we
believe cross constitutional limits”).
16. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 518, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).
17. Id. at 518; Am. Snuff Co., LLC v. U.S., 569 U.S. 946, 946 (2013) (showing that the
tobacco companies appealed other elements of the case to the Supreme Court, but their petition for
review was denied).
18. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, President Obama Delivers Historic
Victory for America’s Kids and Health Over Tobacco (June 23, 2009), https://www.tobaccofree
kids.org/press-releases/id_1161 (emphasis added).
19. Product standards apply even to “grandfathered” products that were available as of
February 15, 2007. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 907.
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• Require larger, graphic warning labels on cigarette products and
advertisements;
• Restrict the sales, advertising, or promotion of tobacco products “to [the]
full extent permitted by the [F]irst [A]mendment”;
• Conduct premarket review any new tobacco products to ensure that they
are “substantially equivalent” to grandfathered products (those on the
market as of February 15, 2007) or that their sale would be “appropriate
for the protection of the public health”;
• Prohibit health-related (“modified risk”) claims that have not been
reviewed and authorized by the FDA; and
• Engage in public health education, including efforts to prevent youth
tobacco use. 20
Public health groups reasoned that even if the FDA was not able to take full
advantage of these powers due to tobacco industry interference or other political
pressures, FDA regulation would still be, on balance, a vast improvement over
the unregulated status quo. 21
III. THE OBAMA YEARS
During the Obama administration, it appeared that the tobacco industry had
the more accurate assessment of how the TCA would play out in practice. The
FDA implemented the mandatory provisions put in the place by the TCA, but,
with the exception of the Deeming Rule (discussed below), the FDA engaged in
no discretionary rulemaking to further the TCA’s goals. Not one product
standard was issued during the Obama administration, and, apart from the
Deeming Rule and the TCA’s mandatory provisions, not one restriction on the
sales, promotion, or marketing of tobacco products was put in place. Moreover,
FDA’s implementation of its premarket review authorities was deeply flawed,
and, at least in some cases, ignored entirely by the industry without any
consequences. 22

20. Id. §§ 3, 201, 906, 907, 910, 911. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Among other
provisions, the TCA also prohibited sales to minors, limited tobacco marketing, and prohibited
flavored cigarettes (with the exception of menthol and tobacco flavors). See id. §§ 103, 907, 910.
As discussed below, the TCA originally limited the FDA’s regulatory authority to cigarettes,
smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco, but it authorized the FDA to extend its authority to
other products meeting the statutory definition of a “tobacco product” through administrative
rulemaking. Id. § 901.
21. Some within the public health community were more skeptical. See, e.g., Glantz et al.,
supra note 11, at 1.
22. See generally Desmond Jenson et al., FDA’s Misplaced Priorities: Premarket Review
under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL 246
(2016).
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A few brief case studies will illustrate how some key issues played out
during the Obama administration.
A.

Menthol

Menthol is a mint-derived additive that reduces the harshness of cigarette
smoking. Menthol cigarettes increase youth initiation of smoking, deepen
nicotine dependence, and inhibit smoking cessation. 23 “Menthol also has a
disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations including youth, African
Americans, Hispanics, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
community, Asian-Americans, and women.” 24 The TCA prohibited the sale of
cigarettes with “characterizing flavor[s],” but included an exception for menthol
flavored-cigarettes. The TCA, however, gave the FDA the authority to limit or
prohibit the use of menthol in cigarettes, and it instructed the FDA’s tobacco
advisory committee, the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee
(TPSAC), to take up the issue of menthol regulation as its first item of
business. 25 In March 2011, TPSAC approved an extensive 249-page review of
the evidence on the topic, concluding that “[r]emoval of menthol cigarettes from
the marketplace would benefit public health in the United States.” 26 Before the
report was even issued, however, Lorillard Tobacco Company and R.J.
Reynolds filed a lawsuit in federal court asserting that several members of
TPSAC should have been disqualified from TPSAC participation for serving as
expert witnesses against tobacco companies, consulting for pharmaceutical
companies, or possessing “pre-existing, well-defined anti-tobacco stances”—
and that the FDA should therefore be barred from relying on TPSAC’s menthol
report. 27 The FDA responded by dismissing the complained-about members
from TPSAC, 28 even though the FDA ultimately prevailed in the litigation. 29
The FDA then decided to conduct its own review of the science surrounding
menthol (perhaps out of concern that a court would block it from relying on
TPSAC’s menthol report). Though this review did not make as direct a policy
recommendation, it too concluded that “adequate data suggest that menthol use

23. Andrea C. Villanti et al., Menthol Cigarettes and the Public Health Standard: A Systematic
Review, 18 BMC PUB. HEALTH 983 (2017).
24. Joelle M. Lester & Stacey Younger Gagosian, Finished with Menthol: An Evidence-Based
Policy Option That Will Save Lives, 45 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 41, 41 (Supp. I 2017).
25. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 3, 907.
26. TOBACCO PRODS. SCI. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 7, at 225.
27. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 58, 124, Lorillard, Inc.
v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:110cv000440 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2013).
28. Statement from Mitch Zeller, FDA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/2015030
8205058/http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/NewsEvents/ucm436783.htm.
29. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 810 F.3d 827, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and thus, the court did not address the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims).
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is likely associated with increased smoking initiation by youth and young
adults,” that “menthol in cigarettes is likely associated with greater addiction,”
and that “it [is] likely that menthol cigarettes pose a public health risk above that
seen with nonmenthol cigarettes.” 30 Instead of initiating regulatory action,
however, the FDA then took the further step of sending out its analysis for peer
review. The public health community started to grumble that the FDA was
dragging its feet. In 2013, when the FDA still had not taken any action, several
public health groups filed a citizen petition asking the FDA to “prohibit menthol
as a characterizing flavor in cigarettes.” 31
The FDA’s response to the Citizen Petition consisted of a three-part
announcement: (1) it issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM), stating that it was considering regulatory options regarding menthol
in cigarettes and inviting public comments; (2) it announced that it would fund
additional research on menthol in cigarettes; and (3) it stated that it was
developing a public education campaign “focused on preventing and reducing
tobacco use, including menthol cigarettes.” 32 The ANPRM garnered more than
174,000 comments, but during the remaining three years of the Obama
administration, the FDA took no further action to address the issue of menthol
in cigarettes.
B.

Graphic Health Warnings

The TCA instructed the FDA to require new, graphic warnings for cigarette
packages and advertisements that would cover the top 50% of the front and rear
panels of cigarette packages and the top 20% of cigarette advertisements. 33
Extensive research has demonstrated that such graphic warnings “increase
knowledge about tobacco use harms and perceptions of risk and promote
smoking cessation.” 34 Accordingly, such warnings are standard practice

30. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE
PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS OF MENTHOL VERSUS NONMENTHOL CIGARETTES 6 (2013).
31. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM ET AL., CITIZEN PETITION:
ASKING THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION TO PROHIBIT MENTHOL AS A
CHARACTERIZING FLAVOR IN CIGARETTES (2013).
32. News Release, FDA, FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol in Cigarettes (July 23, 2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130725191928/http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/ucm361966.htm.
33. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 201.
34. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO HEALTH WARNINGS: EVIDENCE OF
EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2018).
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internationally, 35 but in the U.S., cigarette packages still have the small, textonly warnings that have been on the side of cigarette packages since 1965. 36
The TCA gave the FDA two years to issue a regulation proposing new
warnings. Two years to the day after the TCA’s enactment (June 22, 2011), the
FDA did so, proposing nine images to pair with the nine textual warnings
outlined in the statute. Eight of those images are shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: FDA PROPOSED WARNING IMAGES 37

The rule was immediately challenged in federal court by R.J. Reynolds and
joined by other tobacco companies, which asserted that the rule violated the
companies’ First Amendment rights. 38
The tobacco companies ultimately prevailed on the First Amendment
challenge, with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
concluding in a two-to-one ruling that the images were improper because they
were “primarily intended to evoke an emotional response” rather than to inform
consumers. 39 The court further wrote that the FDA had failed to show the

35. CANADIAN CANCER SOC’Y, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: INTERNATIONAL
STATUS REPORT 2, 6 (5th ed. 2016).
36. See Ellen Peters et al., Emotion in the Law and the Lab: The Case of Graphic Cigarette
Warnings, 2 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 404, 405 (2016) (“The text of the warnings has changed
somewhat over time whereas their size and placement have remained similar for more than 50
years.” The FDA has also acknowledged that the current warnings are “‘invisible’ and fail to
convey relevant information in an effective way.”). See also Required Warnings for Cigarette
Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69.524, 69.525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1141).
37. FDA, https://www.fda.gov/.
38. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir.
2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
39. Id. at 1216, 1222. Earlier, the tobacco industry had challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, the portion of the TCA that required graphic warnings. This challenge was rejected by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Am. Snuff Co., LLC. v. United States, 569 U.S. 946 (2013) (“Because
graphics can present factual information regarding the health risks of using tobacco, and because
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warnings would further the government’s interest in reducing smoking, because
it “offer[ed] no evidence showing that such warnings have directly caused a
material decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries that now require
them.” 40
With respect to the latter point, the FDA’s loss may have been partially selfinflicted. The court repeatedly cited the FDA’s own regulatory impact analysis
(RIA), which estimated that the rule would reduce the U.S. smoking rate by only
0.088%, a number that was “not statistically distinguishable from zero.” 41 The
conclusions of this RIA have been extensively critiqued and undermined by
subsequent scholarship. The RIA relied on analysis of the effects of graphic
warning labels (GWLs) in Canada, but leading scholars have demonstrated that
“GWLs adopted in Canada decreased adult smoking prevalence by 12–20%, 33–
53 times larger than FDA’s estimates.” 42
The court’s conclusions were troubling, and its loose grip on both
psychology 43 and epidemiology 44 have been appropriately criticized
elsewhere—but the decision invalidated only the specific images the FDA had
proposed, not the underlying requirement for the FDA to implement graphic
warnings for cigarettes. In March 2013, following the court’s decision, the FDA
decided not to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Instead, the FDA stated
that it would “undertake [new] research to support a new rulemaking.” 45 Though
the FDA has subsequently funded a considerable amount of research relating to
graphic warnings, it still has not initiated any formal steps to start a new
rulemaking process. Several major public health groups lost patience in October
2016 and filed a lawsuit against the FDA, arguing the FDA had “unlawfully
withheld and unreasonably delayed action on a rule” required by the TCA and

this information alleviates the possibility of consumer confusion, the Act’s graphic-warning
requirement is constitutional. . . .”). Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on the as-applied
challenge to the FDA’s regulation nullified the FDA’s warning requirement.
40. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 1220.
42. Jidong Huang et al., Cigarette Graphic Warning Labels and Smoking Prevalence in
Canada: A Critical Examination and Reformulation of the FDA Regulatory Impact Analysis,
TOBACCO CONTROL, Mar. 2014 at 4 (emphasis added) (“[O]ur estimates imply that if similar
[graphic warning labels] had been implemented in the USA in 2012, this would have led to a
reduction of 5.3–8.6 million adult smokers in the USA in 2013.”).
43. Peters et al., supra note 36, at 409 (“The courts in the R.J. Reynolds case . . . in trying to
distinguish between ‘factual’ and ‘emotional’ messages, applied a simplistic model of the human
mind and how it processes information that is out of sync with current behavioral research.”).
44. Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: Caught in a Pincer
Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 394 (2014) (“The majority’s disdain for the FDA’s
evidence shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the science behind epidemiology.”).
45. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the House (Mar. 15,
2013), https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/u9/Ltr%20to%20Speaker%20re%20
Reynolds%20v%20FDA.PDF.
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asking the court to order the FDA to issue a new rule. 46 In March 2019, the
district court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the FDA to complete
a new rulemaking by March 2020. 47 Even if the FDA meets that deadline,
however, it is likely to give the tobacco companies eighteen months (until
November 2021) to comply with the new warning requirements, and the industry
is certain to challenge any new mandate in court, likely causing further delays.
Additionally, the general legal landscape for mandated warnings has only
become more challenging for the FDA in the meantime, and thus the FDA’s
prospects for success in another legal battle are uncertain. 48
C. The Deeming Rule
The TCA gave the FDA immediate authority over cigarettes, cigarette
tobacco, smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco. However, it also
authorized the agency to regulate “any other tobacco products that the Secretary
by regulation deems” subject to its jurisdiction. 49
Around the time the TCA was passed, the FDA started to realize that ecigarettes (which are not mentioned in the text of the TCA at all) raised potential
public health concerns. In 2009, it tried to bar certain e-cigarettes from being
imported into the country, claiming that they were “unapproved drug-device
combinations.” 50 E-cigarette manufacturers challenged this action in court,
arguing that their products should instead be regulated as tobacco products under
the newly-enacted TCA because they contained nicotine derived from tobacco.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this argument and told the FDA
that e-cigarettes could only be regulated as tobacco products, provided they were

46. Complaint at 25, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 330 F.
Supp. 3d. 367 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11985-IT).
47. Memorandum & Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 6, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Food
& Drug Admin., 330 F. Supp. 3d 657 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11985-IT), 2019 WL 1047149,
at *3.
48. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet et al., The Supreme Court’s Crisis Pregnancy Center Case—
Implications for Health Law, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1489, 1490 (2018) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra and
predicting that “NIFLA may . . . threaten a wide range of commercial-disclosure requirements and
warning laws, despite the Court’s assurances to the contrary.”). Citing the NIFLA decision, a federal
district court judge later enjoined implementation of the FDA’s planned textual warnings for cigars.
Cigar Ass’n v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 317 F. Supp. 3d 555, 558 (D.D.C. 2018).
49. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 901.
50. Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d 891, at 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The
FDA claimed these products were unapproved drug-delivery devices because it appeared that they
were being sold for the purpose of helping to treat the withdrawal symptoms of nicotine addiction.
The FDA argued that the products needed go through the drug approval process before they could
be legally marketed. Id.
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not making therapeutic claims (which would lead them to be classified as drugs
or drug-delivery devices). 51
In 2011, the FDA announced that it would not appeal the court’s decision to
the Supreme Court and would instead issue a “Deeming Rule” to bring ecigarettes under its TCA-based regulatory authority. 52 But while the public
health community waited for the FDA to follow through on this pledge, ecigarette use, particularly, among youth, skyrocketed. Current e-cigarette use
(defined as use within the past thirty days) by high school students increased
from 1.5% in 2011 to 16% in 2015, a more than 900% increase. 53 Youth use of
e-cigarettes is particularly concerning because of nicotine’s ability to induce
structural changes in the brain that enhance the risk of deep, long-lasting nicotine
addiction. 54 Additionally, “[o]ther consequences of early nicotine exposure
include changes to the developing limbic system (the emotional core of the
brain), which increases the likelihood of developing mood disorders, attention
and cognition disorders, and drug-seeking behaviors.” 55 In 2013, forty attorneys
general joined in asking the FDA to move quickly to regulate e-cigarettes, noting
that “e-cigarettes are being marketed to children through cartoon-like
advertising characters and by offering fruit and candy flavors, much like
cigarettes were once marketed to hook new smokers.” 56 Beyond marketing to
youth, other problems resulting from the lack of regulation included a lack of
basic quality control; 57 counterfeit, mislabeled, and contaminated products; 58
use of potentially dangerous flavorants and additives; 59 and false and misleading

51. Id. at 898-99 (“The FDA has authority to regulate customarily marketed tobacco
products—including e-cigarettes—under the [Tobacco Control Act]. It has authority to regulate
therapeutically marketed tobacco products under the FDCA’s drug/device provisions.”).
52. Joyce Frieden, FDA Will Regulate E-Cigarettes as Tobacco, MEDPAGE TODAY (Apr. 26,
2011), https://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/FDAGeneral/26131.
53. See AHMED JAMAL ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE
AMONG MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS — UNITED STATES, 2011–2016 2 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6623a1.htm.
54. Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine Products, 59
B.C.L. REV. 1934, 1949 (2018).
55. Id. at 1941.
56. Regulate E-Cigarettes Like Tobacco Products, 40 Attorneys General Urge FDA, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/regulate-e-cigarettes-like-tobacco-prod
ucts-40-attorneys-general-urge-fda/.
57. Nathan K. Cobb et al., Novel Nicotine Delivery Systems and Public Health: The Rise of
the “E-Cigarette”, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2340, 2341 (2010).
58. Esther E. Omaiye et al., Counterfeit Electronic Cigarette Products with Mislabeled
Nicotine Concentrations, 3 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 347, 353 (2017).
59. Raquel Rutledge, Lab Tests Reveal Popular E-Cigarette Liquids Contain Harmful
Chemicals, J. SENTINEL (Oct. 20, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/
lab-tests-reveal-popular-e-cigarette-liquids-contain-harmful-chemicals-b99583582z1-3348339
61.html/.
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claims. 60 Indeed, knowing that potentially onerous FDA regulation was on its
way quite plausibly led some e-cigarette companies to try to make as much
money as possible in a short period of time, without regard to product safety. 61
In 2014, the FDA finally issued a proposed Deeming Rule. 62 After receiving
and reviewing more than 135,000 comments, it issued a final rule that took effect
on August 8, 2016, deeming itself to have regulatory authority over all “products
meeting the [TCA’s] statutory definition of ‘tobacco product.’” 63
The Deeming Rule extended the FDA’s tobacco-related jurisdiction not only
to e-cigarettes, but also to cigars, cigarillos, pipe tobacco, hookah tobacco, and
other previously unregulated tobacco products. Among other provisions, the
Deeming Rule (1) prohibited sales of the newly-deemed products to minors, (2)
mandated text-only warning labels, and (3) applied the TCA’s general regulatory
framework to the newly-deemed products, including requirements relating to
premarket review and pre-approval of modified risk claims. 64 Industry
associations and individual businesses filed at least a dozen lawsuits challenging
various aspects of the Deeming Rule; as of March 2019, several of those lawsuits
remain pending. 65
The public health community generally welcomed the finalization of the
Deeming Rule, but because the rule had been so extensively delayed, it had a bit
of a “closing the stable door after the horse has bolted” feel to it. 66 Because the
newly-deemed products were subject to the same regulatory structure as
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, finalization of the rule meant that any product
introduced after February 15, 2007 was required to retroactively go through the
premarket review process. The FDA recognized that it would be unfair and
impractical to remove all of the thousands of newly-deemed products from the

60. Elizabeth G. Klein et al., Online E-cigarette Marketing Claims: A Systematic Content and
Legal Analysis, 2 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 252, 259 (2016).
61. This could help explain the problem of exploding e-cigarettes. See, e.g., Susan F. Rudy &
Elizabeth L. Durmowicz, Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems: Overheating, Fires and
Explosions, 26 TOBACCO CONTROL 10, 14 (2017).
62. Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to FDCA, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,142, 23,142–43 (Apr.
25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 1100, 1140, 1143).
63. See generally 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973, 28,974–29,020 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R pt. 1100, 1140, 1143).
64. Id.
65. For a list on ongoing lawsuits, see Lawsuits Challenging the FDA’s Deeming Rule (2019),
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://publichealthlawcenter.org/resources/lawsuits-challenging-fda-deem
ing-rule (last updated Mar. 5, 2019).
66. See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin, The FDA’s E-Cigarette Rule Isn’t Enough, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 6, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-06/curbing-e-ciga
rettes-and-tobacco-use-would-be-obamas-real-moonshot (“. . .At long last, the Food and Drug
Administration finalized its ‘deeming’ rule, putting cigars, pipe tobacco, hookah, e-cigarettes and
other nondrug nicotine products under FDA’s extensive tobacco control authority. But it is too little
and too late.”).
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marketplace while they underwent premarket review. 67 It therefore stated that
products that had been introduced after February 15, 2007, but before the
Deeming Rule was finalized, could stay on the market until they submitted such
applications (which they were required to do within two years) and for another
year thereafter—up to three years in total. 68 But because of Deeming Rule was
not finalized until 2016, this provision—as well as most of the rest of the
Deeming Rule’s requirements—was left for the Trump administration to
implement.
For tobacco control advocates, the Obama years began with the excitement
of the TCA’s passage and ended largely in disappointment. This section
reviewed only a few of the key issues the FDA considered during this period,
but the pattern is clear. Any significant FDA action (or even potential action)
was met with litigation. And while the market continued to rapidly evolve, the
FDA moved forward—if at all—at an exceedingly slow pace, adding
unnecessary procedural steps to its deliberative processes, and at times
producing questionable analyses that undermined its own litigation position. 69
IV. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE FUTURE
When the Trump administration came into office, there was reason for
public health advocates to be concerned about the future direction of FDA
tobacco regulation. 70 But Scott Gottlieb, appointed by President Trump as FDA
67. It would have been unfair, because the companies had no ability to submit a premarket
review application before the Deeming Rule was finalized and thus would have had no ability to
keep their products from being removed from the market even if they could meet the applicable
standards.
68. 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973, 28,978. Smaller e-cigarette manufacturers and retailers complained
that this premarket review requirement would, when fully implemented, put them out of business
because they could not afford the expense of submitting premarket review applications. Andrew
Siddons, E-Cigarette Regulations Could Stymie Small Shops, ROLL CALL (May 5, 2016),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/fda-issues-long-awaited-e-cigarette-regulations
(quoting
Gregory Conley, president of the American Vaping Association, as saying, “If the FDA’s rule is
not changed by Congress or the courts, thousands of small businesses will close in two to three
years.”).
69. For discussion of another example of questionable FDA analysis, see Frank J. Chaloupka
et al., Accounting for “Lost Pleasure” in a Cost–Benefit Analysis of Government Regulation: The
Case of the Food and Drug Administration’s Proposed Cigarette Labeling Regulation, 162
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 64, 65 (2015).
70. Among other reasons, President Trump had previously partnered with Philip Morris to
promote cigarettes at his casino. Adam Shapiro, Trump’s Taj Mahal Tobacco Proposal Shows His
Willingness to Put Profit over People, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think
/opinion/trump-s-taj-mahal-tobacco-proposal-shows-his-willingness-put-ncna889121. He had also
invested in tobacco companies, “including Philip Morris International, its American spinoff Altria
Group, and Reynolds American Inc.” Jessica Glenza, Tobacco Companies Tighten Hold on
Washington Under Trump, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2017/jul/13/tobacco-industry-trump-administration-ties. And for Secretary of Health and Human
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Commissioner, immediately took a personal interest in tobacco regulation and
proposed surprisingly aggressive regulatory action. On July 28, 2017,
Commissioner Gottlieb announced that the FDA was pursuing a
“Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation,” including
exploring the potentially game-changing option of reducing nicotine levels in
cigarettes to non-addictive levels. 71
A.

The FDA’s “Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation”

The FDA’s July 2017 announcement included three components. 72 The
first—and the one that drew the lion’s share of press attention—was its plan to
consider lowering nicotine levels in cigarettes (and, potentially, other tobacco
products) to “minimally-addictive or non-addictive levels.” If the FDA
eventually implements such a regulation, it could have a transformative public
health impact. It is no exaggeration to say that the tobacco industry’s entire
business model is built around the addictiveness of cigarettes (and, in oncesecret internal documents, the industry has admitted as much). 73 Young kids,
who believe they will not become addicted to cigarettes, experiment with
smoking, and then a significant portion of them ultimately become addicted,
long-term cigarette smokers. If cigarettes were not addictive, the business model
of recruiting young “replacement smokers” would fall apart. 74 Modeling by
FDA researchers suggests that if cigarettes were made non-addictive, the
smoking rate would fall from roughly 15% today to 2% by 2040, as the next
generation escapes the trap of addiction to cigarettes. 75

Services (the cabinet official to whom the FDA Commissioner reports), President Trump appointed
Tom Price, a well-established ally of the tobacco industry. Patrick Caldwell, Of Course Trump’s
Health Secretary Is a Friend of Big Tobacco, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.mother
jones.com/politics/2017/02/tom-price-hhs-tobacco/ (noting Price’s history of investing in tobacco
companies and receiving tobacco industry political contributions). Price has since left the
administration.
71. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related
Disease, Death, FDA (July 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannounce
ments/ucm568923.htm.
72. For collected documents outlining the various components of this comprehensive plan, see
FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/to
baccoproducts/newsevents/ucm568425.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 1, 562 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“In internal documents, Defendants admit that stimulating youth smoking initiation and retaining
and increasing their share of the youth market is crucial to the success of their businesses.”).
74. Philip Morris, F.Supp.2d, at 562, 565 (“The only way Defendants can sustain themselves
is by bringing in large numbers of replacement smokers each year.”).
75. Benjamin J. Apelberg et al., Potential Public Health Effects of Reducing Nicotine Levels
in Cigarettes in the United States, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1725, 1725, 1727–30 (2018). This
estimate is based on an “expert elicitation” of the likely effects of nicotine reduction on smoking
cessation, initiation, and dual use. Expert elicitation is helpful to demonstrate the possible impact
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The second prong of the FDA’s plan was to “encourage innovations” by
“extend[ing] timelines to submit tobacco product review applications for newly
regulated tobacco products that were on the market as of August 8, 2016.” 76 This
delay was framed as a way to ensure that if the FDA reduces nicotine levels in
cigarettes, there will be other, less harmful nicotine-delivery alternatives
available to current smokers. In theory, this approach makes sense. As
Commissioner Gottlieb emphasized in his announcement, nicotine makes
cigarettes addictive, but it is the byproducts of combustion that make them
deadly. 77 If current smokers could fully transition to non-combustible nicotine
delivery products, including e-cigarettes, that could be a huge win for public
health. But this prong of the “comprehensive plan” was problematic from the
start for two reasons. First, the FDA delayed until 2021 the requirement to
submit premarket review applications for newly-deemed combustible tobacco
products, including cigars, pipe tobacco, and hookah tobacco. Delaying review
of these products is wholly contrary to the goal of moving current smokers to
less harmful products. Second, it delayed until 2022 the requirement to submit
premarket review applications for newly-deemed non-combustible products,
including e-cigarettes, but only for products that were on the market as of August
8, 2016 (the effective date of the Deeming Rule). 78 By definition, delaying
review of products that are already being sold does nothing to promote
innovation. 79 Other steps—like providing for expedited premarket review of e-

of a nicotine reduction policy in general terms, but the specifics of the model output cannot be
viewed as reliable.
76. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related
Disease, supra note 71.
77. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Protecting American Families:
Comprehensive Approach to Nicotine and Tobacco (July 28, 2017).
78. Unlike the Deeming Rule, the revised guidance did not provide an end date by which these
products would be removed from the market if not authorized for sale by the FDA. This provided
an incentive for companies to avoid submitting their premarket review applications until the last
possible date.
79. In September 2018, Commissioner Gottlieb stated that, given the evidence of surging ecigarette use, the FDA would “re-visit the compliance policy that we announced last summer to
extend the application compliance periods for certain deemed products, including and especially
the e-cigarettes that were on the market as of Aug. 8, 2016.” Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r,
FDA, New Steps to Address Epidemic of Youth E-cigarette Use (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm620185.htm. In doing so,
the Commissioner suggested that the deadline for premarket review had been extended in 2017
because “we wanted to allow time for FDA to establish and more clearly explain the series of
appropriate regulatory gates ‒ and for companies to prepare quality applications for new products
like e-cigarettes” in order to ensure that “there was a clear, viable pathway to seek FDA
authorization to market alternative products for adult smokers who still sought access to nicotine.”
Id. This statement altered the FDA’s previous explanation for the delayed implementation date. It
suggested that the delayed enforcement was not due to a desire to “encourage innovation,” but was
instead due to the FDA’s failure to adequately prepare itself and e-cigarette companies for the
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cigarette products that meet certain criteria, as others have suggested, 80 might
have been more logical ways to promote innovation. 81
As the final prong of the plan, the FDA announced that it would seek public
comment on three issues to “help ensure the agency has the proper science-based
policies in place to meaningfully reduce the harms caused by tobacco use.” 82
The three topics were: (1) regulation of flavors—including menthol—in tobacco
products; (2) regulation of “premium” cigars; and (3) increasing access to
medicinal nicotine (such as gums and patches). 83 As noted above, if nicotine
levels are reduced in cigarettes, then it is important that current smokers have
access to other, safer forms of nicotine. Accordingly, increasing access to
medicinal nicotine, and potentially reformulating the products to make them
more effective, is important. 84 The other two points, however, can hardly be
considered part of a true “comprehensive plan.” The FDA had already studied
these issues in depth, and the FDA’s new call for comments only provided an
opportunity to the opposing sides to revise and resubmit comments they
submitted numerous times before. As discussed above, the FDA already has all
the information it needs to take action on menthol. The new announcement
extended the FDA’s track record of finding additional ways to study the issue
Deeming Rule’s implementation. Given the fact that the Deeming Rule had been in the works for
roughly six years before it was finalized, this is an astounding admission.
80. Eric N. Lindblom, Effectively Regulating E-Cigarettes and Their Advertising—And the
First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 55, 79 (2015).
81. In March 2018, a coalition of public health groups filed a lawsuit against the FDA,
claiming the delay in enforcing the Deeming Rule’s premarket review requirement was unlawful.
That litigation is pending as of this writing. Laurie McGinley, FDA Sued for Delaying E-Cigarette,
Cigar Regulations, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2018/03/27/fda-sued-for-delaying-e-cigarette-cigar-regulations/?utm_term=.ba2e7abc
419f.
82. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related
Disease, supra note 71.
83. Id. Though not mentioned in its announcement, the FDA also opened a docket to
“stimulate dialogue around the subject of possible illicit trade in connection with tobacco product
standards.” Draft Concept Paper: Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products After Implementation of a Food
and Drug Administration Product Standard; Availability; Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg.
11,754, 11,754 (Mar. 16, 2018). This feeds into one of the tobacco companies’ key talking points
against any proposed nicotine standard. Andrew Rowell et al., Tobacco Industry Manipulation of
Data on and Press Coverage of the Illicit Tobacco Trade in the UK, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL, May
2014, at e35, e35 (“Despite historical involvement in the illicit trade, and recent evidence of
complicity, [tobacco companies] continue to use the threat of illicit tobacco to argue against key
tobacco control policies.”).
84. With regard to increasing access to medicinal nicotine products, this is something public
health groups have been calling upon the FDA to do for years and is something the FDA has already
studied and reported upon. See, e.g., Nicotine-Containing Products, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/For
Consumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm345928.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (reporting on FDA’s
TCA-mandated report to Congress on increasing access to medicinal nicotine and its response to a
citizen petition from public health groups on the same topic).
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without taking action. Likewise, the FDA had already sought input on both
flavored products and premium cigars. 85 With respect to premium cigars, the
additional request for comments seems to have been a way to deflect some
pressure from Congress to reconsider its decision (during the Obama
administration) to include such products within the Deeming Rule. 86
After the explosive popularity of JUUL e-cigarettes led youth e-cigarette use
to spike yet again in 2018—prompting Commissioner Gottlieb to refer to use ecigarette use as an “epidemic” 87—the FDA added additional prong entitled
“Youth Tobacco Prevention Plan,” which was absent from the its original plan. 88
The FDA has now also proposed (but not yet finalized) guidance to restrict the
sale of flavored e-cigarettes and move the premarket review date for e-cigarettes
back to 2021. 89
B.

The Future

The future of the FDA’s tobacco-related plans were thrown into question in
March 2019, when Commissioner Gottlieb announced that he was leaving the
FDA. 90 Though his acting replacement, Ned Sharpless, has voiced support for
continuing to pursue the same approach, it is unknown how actively or quickly
he will be able to move it forward—or how long he will even be in that position.

85. FDA’s Early Steps Under New Tobacco Regulatory Framework: Seeking Input, Shaping
Policy, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/News Events/ucm607551.htm#1 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2018). Public comments on both these topics were collected in response to the proposed
Deeming Rule. Id. Importantly, in the final Deeming Rule, the FDA intended to “use its
enforcement discretion to take newly-deemed products with any flavor other than tobacco off the
market – including menthol,” while allowing other newly-deemed products to stay on the market
pending review of their premarket applications. Desmond Jenson & Joelle Lester, FDA Overruled
by White House on Removing Flavored Cigars and E-Cigarette Liquids from the Market, PUB.
HEALTH L. CTR. (June 2, 2016), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/blogs/2016-06-02/fda-over
ruled-white-house-removing-flavored-cigars-and-e-cigarette-liquids-market. However, the FDA
was overruled by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, which edited the Deeming
Rule and “deleted 17 pages of evidence presented by the FDA supporting the need for immediate
regulation of flavors in e-cigarettes and other tobacco products.” Micah L. Berman & Y. Tony
Yang, E-Cigarettes, Youth, and the US Food and Drug Administration’s “Deeming” Regulation,
170 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PEDIATRICS 1039, 1040 (2016).
86. See AAFP to House: Don’t Exempt Cigars from FDA Oversight, AM. ACAD. FAM.
PHYSICIANS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/20170223houseci
garltr.html (discussing congressional efforts to exempt premium cigars from FDA regulation).
87. Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, supra note 79.
88. FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation, supra note 72.
89. FDA, MODIFICATIONS TO COMPLIANCE POLICY FOR CERTAIN DEEMED TOBACCO
PRODUCTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE 14 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/121384/download.
90. Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, F.D.A. Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, Who Fought Teenage
Vaping, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/health/scottgottlieb-resigns-fda.html.
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The challenges in implementing a nicotine reduction rule, however, go far
beyond the question of who the commissioner is. For one, a rule to reduce
nicotine levels in cigarettes must traverse a long road before it becomes a final
regulation. In the medial products context, a 2014 review found that the average
time for the FDA to finalize a significant rule was 7.3 years. 91 And the long road
to a final regulation makes numerous stops at the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which has been quite hostile toward tobacco
regulation (including during the Obama administration). Further, under the
Trump administration, OMB is implementing measures like the “2-for-1 rule”
and “regulatory budgets” that have significantly reduced the pace of federal
administrative rulemaking across the board. 92
The FDA has moved forward with issuing an ANPRM on nicotine
reduction, but an ANPRM is still a long way from a final rule. Indeed, the FDA
Center for Tobacco Products has a poor track record of converting ANPRMs
into final rules. 93 The likelihood that a nicotine rule will be finalized during the
current presidential term is close to zero; the likelihood that it could be finalized
during a potential second Trump administration term is also extremely low. Plus,
at the end of the process, there is likely to be a lawsuit that could delay the
implementation of a final rule even further. 94
Moreover, the tobacco industry—despite its rhetoric of wanting a “smokefree future”—will not accept a nicotine reduction regulation without a fight and
will certainly try to slow down the FDA’s progress as much as possible.95
Already, the major tobacco companies have been reassuring investors that a
nicotine rule is not coming anytime soon. Altria General Counsel Murray
Garnick told investors that the FDA’s plan kicks off “a long-term process with
multiple opportunities for stakeholders to provide perspective,” and he

91. Thomas J. Hwang et al., Quantifying the Food and Drug Administration’s Rulemaking
Delays Highlights the Need for Transparency, 33 HEALTH AFF. 309, 311–12 (2014).
92. Roncevert Almond et al., Regulatory Reform in the Trump Era: The First 100 Days, 35
YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 29, 30, 46 (2017); CONNOR RASO, WHERE AND WHY HAS AGENCY
RULEMAKING DECLINED UNDER TRUMP? (Brookings Inst. eds., 2018).
93. See Eric N. Lindblom, Should FDA Try to Move Smokers to E-Cigarettes and Other LessHarmful Tobacco Products and, if so, How, 73 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 276, 294 (2018).
94. There is also likely to be a delay between the time that a rule is finalized (or finally upheld
in court) and the date it goes into effect. The TCA provides that a product standard cannot take
effect “before 1 year after the date of its publication unless the Secretary determines that an earlier
effective date is necessary for the protection of the public health.” Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act § 907(d)(2). If the FDA attempted to mandate an effective date less than a
year from the time the rule is finalized, that would certainly trigger further litigation.
95. There seems to be unanimity among experts on this point. See David Lazarus, White House
Could be Blowing Smoke with Plan to Cut Nicotine in Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-fda-cigarettes-nicotine-20180323story.html (reporting that “[n]ot one expert I spoke with said they think Big Tobacco will roll over
and accept a reduction of nicotine in cigarettes”).
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foreshadowed several potential lines of legal attack against a final rule. 96
Likewise, Reynolds American emphasized to investors that the FDA rulemaking
process is a “multi-year” undertaking and that the company is “well prepared
and will be actively engaged” in the process. 97 Besides lobbying the FDA and
appealing to the courts, the industry also has other levels to pull. If the FDA does
proceed in moving quickly towards a final rule reducing nicotine levels in
cigarettes, the industry could seek to use its influence with Congress, the OMB,
and the White House to prevent such a rule from being finalized (and,
potentially, to revoke the FDA’s authority to issue such a product standard).
Thus, despite its massive public health potential, it is unlikely that a nicotine
reduction rule is coming anytime soon. In the meantime, though, the FDA’s
decision to delay the review of newly-deemed products took effect immediately.
As noted above, the argument that this delay “encourage[s] innovation” does not
hold up to scrutiny, as it only applies to products that were already on the market
when the Deeming Rule was finalized. 98 Instead, e-cigarette companies were left
with virtually free reign to continue promoting and selling their products in a
largely unregulated environment that the FDA had previously referred to as the
“wild, wild west.” 99 The result has been an unprecedented surge in youth e-

96. Remarks by Marty Barrington, and Other Members of Altria’s Senior Management Team
at Altria’s Investor Day (Nov. 2, 2017), http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/80/80855
/2017InvestorDay/Remarks_and_Reconciliations.pdf. For why these legal arguments are not
convincing, see Micah L. Berman et al., Anticipating Industry Arguments: The US Food and Drug
Administration’s Authority to Reduce Nicotine Levels in Cigarettes, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 502
(2018). There is nonetheless a high likelihood that litigation could succeed in delaying the
implementation of any nicotine reduction rule.
97. Danny Herko, Exec. Vice President of Scientific & Regulatory Affairs, RAI Servs. Co.,
Presentation to British American Tobacco (2017).
98. Problematically, there is clear evidence that new products are being introduced illegally
nonetheless, and the FDA has thus far failed to take any action to address them. Chris Kirkham,
Special Report-High Nicotine E-Cigarettes Flood Market Despite FDA Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 24,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/vaping-regulation-juul/special-report-high-nicotine-e-ciga
rettes-flood-market-despite-fda-rule-idUSL2N1WA017 (“[A] new wave of lower-priced Juul
knock-offs is showing up at convenience stores, vape shops and online - despite a U.S. Food and
Drug Administration rule banning the sale of new e-cigarette products after August 2016 without
regulatory approval”).
99. Julia Belluz, The Wild West of E-Cigarettes Just Ended with a New, Sweeping Federal
Rule, VOX (May 5, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/5/11595784/fda-rule-e-cigarettes-tobacco
(quoting Mitch Zeller, the Director of the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products). The FDA might
disagree that these companies still operate in the “wild west,” but the FDA’s enforcement actions
have been almost entirely limited to policing illegal sales to minors. With limited exceptions, it has
not addressed the misleading and unauthorized claims that remain rampant in e-cigarette marketing.
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cigarette use, driven by the explosive popularity of JUUL 100—a development
the FDA is now belatedly scrambling to address. 101
V. CONCLUSION
This largely pessimistic review of tobacco regulation under the TCA is not
meant to question the efforts or intentions of those leading the FDA Center for
Tobacco Products (CTP). Rather, it is to suggest that the optimistic vision that
FDA regulation would “fundamentally change how tobacco products are
manufactured, marketed and sold in the United States” 102 was perhaps
unrealistic (or at least unlikely) from the start. Even if its leadership wanted to
push forward with a powerful tobacco control measure (prohibiting the sale of
menthol cigarettes, for example), the structural challenges facing CTP are
immense. A more rigorous analysis of those barriers is needed, but some of them
can be briefly cataloged here.
As an initial matter, CTP is the newest of the FDA’s six centers and must
compete with the interests of other centers when the FDA sets its priorities.
Regulation of drugs and medical devices tends to dominate the FDA’s agenda,
with former commissioner Gottlieb’s personal interest and involvement in
tobacco regulation being the exception rather than the rule. The FDA is in turn
just one agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
and so it must then compete with the other priorities of the Department. During
the Obama administration, for example, HHS leadership was understandably
preoccupied with implementing and defending the Affordable Care Act. And,
for high-level decisions that require White House involvement, HHS is just one
of the many cabinet agencies. Thus, what may look to the outside like wheelspinning may reflect the difficulties inherent in pushing aggressive policy
measures through so many levels of review.
Moreover, the rulemaking process provides many opportunities for public
health initiatives to get derailed. In addition to lengthy and complex internal
FDA processes and the well-established pathologies of the notice-and-comment

100. Andrea S. Gentzke et al., Vital Signs: Tobacco Product Use Among Middle and High
School Students—United States, 2011–2018, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 157, 162
(2019).
101. Moreover, the FDA has, to date, failed to remove from the market the new e-cigarette
products (largely JUUL copycats) that have been illegally introduced after the effective date of the
Deeming Rule, tacitly giving the green light to companies to keep developing and introducing new
products without going through the required FDA review. Kirkham, supra note 98. The FDA did
send warning letters to some of these companies in October 2018, but no other action has been
taken. Press Release, FDA, FDA Advances Investigation into Whether More Than 40 E-cigarette
Products are Being Illegally Marketed and Outside Agency’s Compliance Policy (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-advances-investigation-whethermore-40-e-cigarette-products-are-being-illegally-marketed-and.
102. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 18.
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process, 103 proposed rules must make repeated trips to OMB, where the tobacco
industry can lobby for them to be delayed, weakened, or killed. 104 Members of
Congress can also weigh in, threatening to take retaliatory action against the
FDA if it proceeds. Indeed, the mere mention that the FDA was open to a
prohibition on menthol cigarettes provoked a strong response from the two
senators from North Carolina (the home state of R.J. Reynolds). 105 And all of
these structural obstacles are without reference to the dynamics of the current
administration, which has put policies in place that are designed to make it
extremely difficult for any regulatory agency to issue new regulations.
Should the FDA nonetheless somehow succeed in finalizing a regulation
that threatens the industry’s interests, tobacco manufacturers, retailers, or trade
associations will be standing by ready to litigate. And federal courts, as a general
matter, are becoming less deferential towards regulatory agencies 106 and more
receptive to the First Amendment claims of corporations. 107 In short, the TCA
set up tobacco regulation to play out in arenas—the FDA, OMB, courts, and
Congress—that tend to be challenging turf for public health groups to navigate.
Evaluating the impact of FDA tobacco regulation overall is complicated by
the fact that it is impossible to say what would have happened in the absence of
such regulation. Perhaps the mere fact of FDA tobacco regulation has thwarted
some negative developments that might otherwise have occurred. But if public
health advocates are relying on the FDA to proactively lead the way forward,
they are likely to be disappointed. In the U.S., tobacco control has historically

103. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L. J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (“Important rulemaking initiatives grind along [through the noticeand-comment rulemaking process] at such a deliberate pace that they are often consigned to
regulatory purgatory, never to be resurrected again.”).
104. The current acting administrator of the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, which is the office that reviews agency rules, has said that one of his top priorities is to
“ensur[e] that all relevant federal stakeholders are able to review a regulation and comment on it[.]”
Cheryl Bolen, Trump’s New Regulations Chief to Oversee Major Rule Rollbacks, BLOOMBERG
GOV. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://about.bgov.com/news/trumps-new-regulations-chief-oversee-majorrule-rollbacks/. Protecting the public health policymaking process from the influence of the tobacco
industry is key pillar of the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control. Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, WHO, https://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/adopted/article_5_3/en/ (last visited
May 1, 2019). The U.S., however, is not a party to that agreement.
105. Richard Craver, Burr, Tillis Push Back Against Tighter FDA Tobacco Restrictions,
Particularly Banning Menthol Cigarettes, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.jour
nalnow.com/business/burr-tillis-push-back-against-tighter-fda-tobacco-restrictions-particularly/ar
ticle_6077f034-13c1-599e-ad3f-544848dbcd74.html.
106. Rex S. Heinke et al., The Supreme Court Takes Aim at Deference to Administrative
Agencies, N.Y. L. J. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/05/the-su
preme-court-takes-aim-at-deference-to-administrative-agencies/.
107. See generally Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV.
L. REV. F. 165 (2015).
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been more innovative and effective at more local levels, where the tobacco
industry tends to have less power and influence. 108 Despite the broad authority
that the FDA now has, policymaking at the state and local levels is still likely to
be the most effective pathway forward.

108. Heather Wipfli & Jonathan M. Samet, One Hundred Years in the Making: The Global
Tobacco Epidemic, 37 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 149, 153 (2016) (reviewing history and discussing
how “[a]dvocates in the United States combated the tobacco industry primarily by focusing on state
and local action.”). Of course, the tobacco industry has historically been quite influential in certain
tobacco-growing regions. Amanda Fallin & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco-Control Policies in
Tobacco-Growing States: Where Tobacco Was King, 93 MILBANK Q. 319, 321 (2015) (“The
tobacco industry has been especially concerned about blocking tobacco taxes in tobacco states, has
promoted a pro-tobacco social norm in these states, and has succeeded in winning state laws that
preempt local clean indoor air laws in tobacco-growing states.”).
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